I won’t even attempt to feign the impression that I’m keeping up with what has been published in 2017, instead you find here a list of book which I have read this year and which influenced my thinking: Continue reading “My 2017 Book List”
As part of the course I’m co-teaching with James Lewis I have produced seminar handouts, which cover the topics of the respective weeks. In the present post, I want to reflect on this teaching tool.
The handouts only provide the shortest of introduction to the week’s topic and then raises a number of questions we can address in the seminar (see the example handout). They don’t summarise the lectures, but rather hint at the most important issues by raising questions about them. Usually there is also one quote, or one central picture intended to remind the student of a key insight from the lectures. For example, on the group agency handout I provide a quote from List and Pettit specifying the necessary and jointly sufficient features for agency. Continue reading “Seminar Handouts”
I’m co-teaching a module at the University of Sheffield this term (Autumn 2017-2018) together with James Lewis. We called our course I, You, We and treat broadly the philosophy of the social. James focusses on second-person relations and I present key issues in social ontology. In particular, I consider the debates on joint actions, group agency, group ontology, and Brian Epstein’s recent contribution. James and I will also have week on feminist contributions.
The syllabus of the module is available on my academia.edu page.
Relevant blog posts for my students and others interested in social ontology:
I’ll admit it upfront, I’m joining the illustrous club of academics who present on the same topic twice in a row. Attendees of the ENPOSS conference in Cracow can look forward to a talk revealing the weakness of attempts to analyse group membership as mereological parthood. In particular, I look at nested groups just as I did at the ENSO V. However, I promise that the audience will hear new material. I got feedback at the ENSO conference and will try to address it in my talk (although I will have only so much time to respond to potential criticisms).
I talk on Thursday 21st of September (see program).
Presumably not, but maybe it’s more difficult to tell than it seems.
Kirk Ludwig attended my recent talk at the ENSO V conference and raised an interesting issue during the Q&A. I argued against analysing being a group member as being a part of a group (plus a restriction to individuals). He suggested that there is an easier argument against analysing group membership as such a restricted parthood: Even if I had a part who was an agent, I would not be a group agent. Say it turned out that one of my body parts was an agent, this body part would not be a member of me and I would not be a group. At least that is what Ludwig proposed.
I tentatively replied that perhaps one might consider the body part a member after all and I might turn out to be a group, but Ludwig wasn’t swayed by my bold assertion and we left it there. After all, his point wasn’t threatening my argument. It only provided further support for my overall conclusion. Nonetheless, I keep thinking about Ludwig’s argument and I’m not sure I agree with him. Continue reading “Am I a Group Agent?”
The topic of my paper changed less than papers you submit half a year in advance tend to do. I’ll discuss how cases of nested groups, such as a philosophy department being nested in a university, bear on our ontology of groups.
Mereology plays a bigger role than in my original draft. My talk has significant repercussions for how can think about the members and parts of groups. For more details, attend my talk! (Or drop me a line and I’ll share a draft with you.)