Presumably not, but maybe it’s more difficult to tell than it seems.
Kirk Ludwig attended my recent talk at the ENSO V conference and raised an interesting issue during the Q&A. I argued against analysing being a group member as being a part of a group (plus a restriction to individuals). He suggested that there is an easier argument against analysing group membership as such a restricted parthood: Even if I had a part who was an agent, I would not be a group agent. Say it turned out that one of my body parts was an agent, this body part would not be a member of me and I would not be a group. At least that is what Ludwig proposed.
I tentatively replied that perhaps one might consider the body part a member after all and I might turn out to be a group, but Ludwig wasn’t swayed by my bold assertion and we left it there. After all, his point wasn’t threatening my argument. It only provided further support for my overall conclusion. Nonetheless, I keep thinking about Ludwig’s argument and I’m not sure I agree with him. Continue reading “Am I a Group Agent?”
As mentioned in a previous post, I will give a talk on homuncularism and group agency in Milan tomorrow. More information on the workshop, which is about cognition in groups, can be found on the website of the organisers.
There are two ideal types of talks: There are talks where you already have a full paper before you apply and then try to tour the world with your paper. And there are talks where you submit a vague abstract and then try to figure out what you are actually saying. My talk in Milan falls into the latter category. If you plan to attend and hope to hear me talk exactly about what I promised in the abstract, you are in for a disappointment. Continue reading “Talk in Milan: Homuncularism and Group Agency”
On the 31st of March I will present at a workshop in Milan on Cognition in Groups. My topic will be homuncularism and group agency. More specifically, I will talk about how the homuncularism objection might and might not apply to theories of group agency.
More information on the workshop and my talk can be found on the website of the organisers.
This post presents a question about chapter 8 of Daniel Dennett’s From Bacteria to Bach and Back. For more information see this post.
On pages 161-162 Professor Dennett expresses his regret for certain formulations he used for presenting his position. The position in question is homuncular functionalism and Professor Dennett has come to regret the use of the terms “committee” and “machine” in presenting it. I can see, why he finds the term “committe” misleading. He is unhappy with the “cooperative bureaucracy” suggested by it. Continue reading “Dennett’s FBtBaB: Chapter Eight”