Quote of the Week: Jeffrey on Desirability

“It my indeed by that I desire something, and later, when I have it, find it not as good as I had thought. This is a case where my judgement of desirability have changed as a result of experience.”  – Richard Jeffrey. The Logic of Decision. p. 63

I am currently rereading Richard Jeffrey’s classic The Logic of Decision to refresh my knowledge of decision theoy and this passage caught my eye. It occurs in a discussion of whether we can desire something we have (or believe to have) and amounts to little more than an aside. For a quote of the week it might seem less than exciting, but it surprised and excited me.

The formulation is not entirely clear, but Jeffrey appears to suggest that a desire is a judgement that something is desirable. The goodness of the thing appears to come first. We learn it through experience and adapt or at least should adapt our desires to it. Our judgements of desirability are proven wrong, if things are less good than we thought. It is not just that we found out that we have different desires than we thought, rather our judgements of desirability are proven wrong by experience.

This picture conflict with the kind of non-cognitive Humeanism I would have assumed to find in a book on decision theory. I would have assumed that Jeffrey presents desires not as a form of judgement and that the goodness of objects would not guide the desires. Desires would be practical states conferring the desirabaility to objects. Instead I found this surprising quote, which reminds me more Elijah Millgram’s work on practical reasoning.

Sadly, I am still catching up on decision theory and lack acquaintance with Jeffrey’s later work. I do not know yet whether this quote conflicts with Jeffrey’s other contributions or whether it fits in.

Quote of the Week: L. A. Paul on Having Children

I conclude that having your first child, in many ways, is like becoming a vampire.

– L. A. Paul, Transformative Experience, p. 82

This quote invites jokes and Paul makes one in a footnote. (You have to get the book to find out what the punchline is. It is not that great.) But she also has a serious point. Both choices, having a child or becoming a vampire pose problems to normative decision theory. Can we ever rationally choose to become parents or rationally choose against it? The decision would lead to unforeseeable experiences, which transform our own motivations.

For more see my discussion of Paul’s book.

Reading: Transformative Experience

L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience has received unusually broad praise for a contemporary work in analytic philosophy. How many proper philosophy books come with a quote from a Slate interview on the back?

Paul’s book deserves the attention, whether or not you are convinced by its conclusion. It presents an issue of decision theory in clear terms and with accessible examples. At the heart of the book lies the question how we can rationally choose in light of a transformative experiences, such as turning into a vampire or having a child. Continue reading “Reading: Transformative Experience”